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Abstract: We study the effects of traditional cigarette tax rate changes and e-cigarette tax 
adoption on use of these products among US adults. Data are drawn from the Behavioral Risk 
Factor Surveillance System and National Health Interview Survey data over the period 2011 to 
2017. Using a difference-in-differences model, we find that higher traditional cigarette taxes 
reduce adult traditional cigarette use and increase adult e-cigarette use, suggesting that the 
products are economic substitutes. E-cigarette tax adoption reduces e-cigarette use, with some 
heterogeneity across groups, and dilutes the own-tax responsiveness of traditional cigarettes. 
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1. Introduction 
As of 2017, 34.4 million adults (14.0%) in the United States smoked traditional cigarettes and 
6.9 million (2.8%) used electronic cigarettes (e-cigarettes) and other vaping devices delivering 
nicotine (Wang et al. 2018).1 Because they deliver nicotine (the addictive ingredient in tobacco 
products) without carcinogens and other toxicants found in traditional cigarettes, e-cigarettes 
may be a healthier alternative to traditional cigarettes for smokers who cannot quit. The US 
Surgeon General has concluded that, while e-cigarettes are not harmless, these products contain 
fewer toxicants than traditional cigarettes (US Department of Health and Human Services 2016).  
The potential substitutability of traditional cigarettes and e-cigarettes presents a unique 
challenge to policymakers. On one hand, taxing and restricting access to e-cigarettes may help to 
reduce overall nicotine intake within the population. On the other hand, such measures may harm 
the health of those who smoke by discouraging them from switching to safer sources of nicotine 
such as e-cigarettes or from using e-cigarettes as a cessation device (Hajek et al. 2019). US 
localities have taken a variety of approaches toward e-cigarette regulation. Early regulations 
focused on youth access and curtailing use in some public places. More recent regulations 
include taxes. At the end of 2018, all but two states had prohibited youth from purchasing e-
cigarettes,2 15 states had banned e-cigarettes in some public places, and nine states had passed e-
cigarette excise taxes (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2019).  
                                                          
1 Throughout the paper, we refer to the act of smoking as exclusive to traditional cigarette use. We also refer to the 
act of vaping as exclusive to nicotine consumption via e-cigarettes. E-cigarettes are also referred to as e-cigs, vapes, 
e-hookahs, vape pens, and electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS). There are three types of e-cigarettes: (1) 
disposable single-use products, (2) kits that include a rechargeable device and cartridges containing liquid nicotine, 
and (3) tank or pod systems used to vaporize liquid nicotine. In this paper, we follow the US Surgeon General’s 
convention in referring to all of these products as e-cigarettes (US Department of Health and Human Services 2016). 
While most vaping products contain nicotine, some contain marijuana and some contain only flavoring. 
2 Regardless of state law, the Food and Drug Administration’s 2016 Deeming Rule established a federal minimum 
legal sales age of 18. 
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In this study, we leverage cross-state, over-time variation in the traditional cigarette 
excise tax rate increases that occurred in 18 states from 2011 to 2017, as well as the 
implementation of e-cigarette taxes in eight states and two counties, to examine own- and cross-
product tax responsiveness. We utilize two national large-scale health survey data sources—the 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System and the National Health Interview Survey—that 
include detailed information on both smoking and vaping. We have several key findings. First, 
traditional cigarette taxes reduced smoking among adults from 2011 to 2017. Second, traditional 
cigarette taxes increased e-cigarette use among adults, suggesting that the products are economic 
substitutes. Third, e-cigarette taxes may reduce e-cigarette use, particularly for males. Fourth, the 
introduction of an e-cigarette tax appears to reduce traditional cigarette own-tax elasticity; 
increasing the price of e-cigarettes could discourage smokers from using e-cigarettes as a 
smoking cessation device or transitioning to e-cigarettes as a less harmful source of nicotine 
when faced with a traditional cigarette tax-rate increase. Policymakers developing an overall 
tobacco-control strategy that targets both traditional cigarettes and e-cigarettes should carefully 
consider spillovers from one policy to another.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Data and 
variables are described in section 3, and our methods are discussed in section 4. Results are 
reported in section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
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2. Related literature  
Our paper builds on the existing bodies of work on the own- and cross-price elasticities of 
traditional cigarettes and e-cigarettes among US adults.3 Below, we discuss the existing literature 
on these topics as well as our specific contributions. 
 
2.1 Own-price elasticity of traditional cigarettes  
A voluminous economics literature estimates the price elasticity of traditional cigarettes across 
various countries and periods. Chaloupka and Warner (2000) review studies prior to 2000, 
concluding that smoking is responsive to price but relatively inelastic, with most estimated price 
elasticities of total demand falling in the –0.3 to –0.5 range for adults. A more recent review by 
the Community Preventive Services Task Force (2014) estimates a traditional cigarette total 
demand price elasticity of –0.37 for adults, which is approximately equally split by effects on the 
extensive and intensive smoking margins. 
The endogeneity of traditional cigarette prices is a potential concern with these estimates, 
as prices are determined by changes in demand and supply factors, which could lead to omitted 
variable bias in regression coefficient estimates and associated elasticity calculations (Gruber 
and Köszegi 2001; Gruber and Frakes 2006). A large number of more recent economics studies 
use traditional cigarette taxes rather than prices to reduce these endogeneity concerns.4 In 2018, 
state taxes represented 23 percent of the weighted retail price for traditional cigarettes 
(Orzechowski and Walker 2018), suggesting that an adult price elasticity of demand of –0.40 
converts to a state-level tax elasticity of demand of approximately –0.10.  
                                                          
3 There is also a literature on the effects of various e-cigarette policies—particularly minimum age laws—on youth 
smoking (Dave, Feng, and Pesko 2019; Friedman 2015; Pesko and Currie 2019; Pesko, Hughes, and Faisal 2016). 
4 While tax rates are not as directly determined by demand as prices, they are nonetheless established within the 
state’s political economy and thus not purely exogenous (Besley and Case 2000). 
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Our contribution to the literature on the own-price elasticity of demand for traditional 
cigarettes is to calculate an adult smoking participation tax elasticity during the period when e-
cigarettes were widely available. Given this objective, benchmarking adult traditional cigarette 
tax-rate responsiveness for comparison with our findings is important.5 We identify several 
studies calculating traditional cigarette tax-rate responsiveness for adults using nationally 
representative US data just before e-cigarettes became widely available. We contend that these 
studies are the most relevant to our own work while acknowledging that they do not reflect the 
universe of studies estimating traditional cigarette demand equations. 
Cotti, Nesson, and Tefft (2016) use household scanner data from 2004 to 2012 to 
calculate a tax elasticity of –0.16. Similarly, Nesson (2017) finds an elasticity of –0.15 using the 
1988 to 2012 National Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys; Bishop (2018) documents an 
elasticity of –0.18 using 1999 to 2012 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System data; and 
Callison and Kaestner (2014) estimate an elasticity range from –0.06 to –0.03 using data from 
the 1995 to 2007 Current Population Survey Tobacco Use Supplements.  
By examining more recent data, we explore whether the introduction of e-cigarettes into 
US tobacco product markets may have altered traditional cigarette tax responsiveness. The 
availability of a popular smoking cessation product as a close substitute may have lowered 
smokers’ disutility from quitting cigarettes. E-cigarettes may enable some smokers to quit or to 
switch to a less harmful nicotine source as cigarette taxes rise.  
 
                                                          
5 Though our focus here is on prime age adults, we note that there is also a literature using quasi-experimental 
methods to estimate the tax elasticity of cigarettes among youth (DeCicca, Kenkel, and Mathios 2002; Carpenter and 
Cook 2008; Hansen, Sabia, and Rees 2017; Courtemanche and Feng 2018) and older adults (DeCicca and McLeod 
2008; Maclean, Kessler, and Kenkel 2016). 
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2.2 Own-price elasticity of e-cigarettes, and cross-price elasticity between traditional cigarettes 
and e-cigarettes 
Several recent studies estimate the own-price elasticity of e-cigarettes along with the cross-price 
elasticity between traditional cigarettes and e-cigarettes. To the best of our knowledge, all studies 
use e-cigarette prices generated from retail scanner data: researchers construct aggregated, area-
level price measures based on prices that retailers in that area scan at purchase.6 As we discuss 
later in this paper, US localities have only recently implemented e-cigarette taxes. Thus, earlier 
studies could not exploit this source of plausibly exogenous variation. They instead relied on 
prices, which are likely vulnerable to similar endogeneity concerns noted by Gruber and Köszegi 
(2001) and Gruber and Frakes (2006) in the context of traditional cigarette prices.  
Three studies evaluate the effect of these e-cigarette prices on traditional cigarette and e-
cigarettes sales. Huang et al. (2018) use data from 2007 to 2014 to estimate e-cigarette own-price 
elasticities for rechargeable e-cigarettes of –1.4 and for disposable e-cigarettes of –1.6. Zheng et 
al. (2017) use data from 2009 to 2013 to document an e-cigarette own-price elasticity of demand 
of –2.1, a cross-price elasticity of traditional cigarette prices on e-cigarettes sales of 1.9, and a 
cross-price elasticity of e-cigarette prices on traditional cigarette sales of 0.004. Stoklosa, Drope, 
and Chaloupka (2016) use European data from 2011 to 2014 to estimate an e-cigarette own-price 
elasticity of demand of –0.8 and a cross-price elasticity of traditional cigarette prices on e-
cigarette sales of 4.6.  
Survey data have also been used in four studies to estimate the effect of e-cigarette prices 
on e-cigarette use. Saffer et al. (2018) use data on adults from the 2014 to 2015 Tobacco Use 
Supplement of the Current Population Survey to estimate an e-cigarette price elasticity of vaping 
                                                          
6 These prices include excise taxes but do not include sales taxes. 
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participation of –1.2. Pesko et al. (2018) use two years of the Monitoring the Future Survey data 
of middle and high school students and find a –1.8 own price elasticity of days vaping. Pesko 
and Warman (2017) use National Youth Tobacco Survey (NYTS) data from 2011 to 2015 to 
show a substitution effect: higher prices for e-cigarette cartridges (the fixed component of a 
rechargeable e-cigarette) reduce youth e-cigarette use and increase current traditional cigarette 
consumption, especially for males and for older teenagers. Finally, Cantrell et al. (2019) use 
national longitudinal cohort data on a sample of 15- to 21-year-olds from 2014 to 2016 and find 
no effect of e-cigarette prices, but a cross-cigarette price elasticity of 0.9.  
Discrete choice experiments (DCEs) have also been applied to estimate the price-
responsiveness of traditional cigarettes and e-cigarettes. DCEs are a stated preference method in 
which respondents are presented with hypothetical purchasing decisions when product attributes 
such as prices are varied. Marti et al. (2019), for example, use a sample of adult smokers who are 
asked to choose between traditional cigarettes and e-cigarettes when price, relative health of e-
cigarettes, effectiveness of e-cigarettes as a smoking cessation aid, and coverage of smoking 
bans in public places are varied. While the probability of selecting an e-cigarette declines as its 
hypothetical price increases, health reasons appear to be more important than prices for adult 
smokers’ e-cigarette choices. Another recent study suggests more of a role of price in the choice 
of traditional cigarettes and e-cigarettes (Pesko et al. 2016), with an estimated e-cigarette own-
price elasticity among current adult smokers of 1.8. 
One study explores the effects of traditional cigarette taxes on adult e-cigarette use. Cotti, 
Nesson, and Tefft (2018) use Nielson household scanner data to show that traditional cigarette 
tax increases lead to a decline in purchases of both products. This finding implies that the 
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products are economic complements, which contrasts with the results from the majority of 
studies discussed above that suggest substitutability across the products. 
We contribute to the literature on the own-price elasticity of e-cigarettes by providing, to 
the best of our knowledge, the first exploration of the effect of e-cigarette taxes—rather than 
prices—on e-cigarette use. Our study also makes three distinct contributions to the literature on 
cross-price effects. First, we provide the first analysis of the effect of e-cigarette taxes (rather 
than prices) on adult smoking. Second, we use survey data to examine the impact of cigarette 
taxes (rather than prices) on adult e-cigarette use.  
Finally, we investigate the potential interactive effect of traditional cigarette and e-
cigarette taxes, which has not been explored. The intuition is similar to that discussed above 
regarding the possibility that the widespread availability of e-cigarettes may have altered 
traditional cigarette own-tax responsiveness. Increasing the price of e-cigarettes implicitly 
reduces their availability,7 which could inhibit some smokers from quitting or from switching to 
the less harmful product as a source of nicotine as traditional cigarette taxes rise. This question is 
interesting from both an economics perspective and from a practical standpoint.  
From an economics perspective, this question explores whether price elasticities are 
potentially a function of the prices of related goods. Additionally, policymakers often adopt both 
traditional cigarette and e-cigarette regulations as part of an overall tobacco control strategy 
(Maclean et al. 2018). If these policies have interactive effects, then policymakers may wish to 
consider how policies operate jointly when selecting the optimal set of regulations for their 
                                                          
7 It does this through standard price effects. When the price increases, the quantity demanded should decrease. There 
are other nonprice pathways from taxes to changes in tobacco product use. For instance, taxes may signal to 
consumers that the taxed product is unsafe. This phenomenon has been documented in other health behavior 
contexts: for example, soda taxes. See an excellent discussion of this issue by Gostin (2017). We are not able to 
distinguish between these alternative mechanisms. However, at the market level, both predict that consumption 
should decline following a tax hike. 
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jurisdiction. Put differently, if taxing both products enhances the effectiveness of either tax, then 
policymakers should consider developing tobacco control strategies that incorporate both 
policies. On the other hand, if taxing one product mutes the effectiveness of the alternative tax, 
then policymakers may wish to consider adopting just one tax to maximize the social objective 
(e.g., reducing smoking within the population).  
 
3. Data 
We use data for the period 2011 to 2017 from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System 
(BRFSS) and the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS).8 The US federal government and 
health economists use these data sources to track health behaviors such as vaping and smoking 
(Barbaresco, Courtemanche, and Qi 2015; Miller and Wherry 2017; Horn, Maclean, and Strain 
2017; Pesko 2014). We use geocoded versions of the BRFSS and the NHIS available through 
federal statistical research data centers. Thus, we have access to granular geographic information 
not available in the public use files, which allows us to accurately study sub-state taxes.  
We combine these two data sources to maximize data on e-cigarette use, which have only 
recently been added to national surveys. Combing data sets in this manner is not uncommon 
within economics (Maclean, Tello-Trillo, and Webber 2019; Webber 2016; Farber et al. 2018; 
Altonji, Kahn, and Speer 2016; Miller 2012). The BRFSS surveys over 400,000 adults annually, 
and the NHIS surveys approximately 33,000 adults annually as part of its adult sample, where e-
cigarette information is queried. Both data sources ask about traditional and e-cigarette use. To 
                                                          
8 We begin our study period in 2011 due to a change in the BRFSS survey frame. Prior to 2011, the BRFSS, which 
is a telephone survey, only conducted surveys on landlines. Beginning in 2011, cellphones were added to the survey 
frame to better capture a population that represented the United States. This change lead to a compositional shift in 
survey respondents, and thus we follow CDC recommendations and do not combine pre- and post-2011 data. In 
addition, the focus on relatively recent years enables us to isolate the period in which e-cigarettes were widely 
available in US tobacco product markets, which is our main contribution to the traditional cigarette tax elasticity 
literature. 
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measure traditional cigarette use, surveyors first ask respondents if they have smoked at least 100 
traditional cigarettes in their lifetime. If so, do they now smoke every day, some days, or not at 
all? The BRFSS added e-cigarette questions in 2016 and  the NHIS did so in 2014. Both surveys 
ask respondents if they have ever used e-cigarettes and, if so, if they now use e-cigarettes every 
day, some days, or not at all. 
We make two sample restrictions. First, we drop respondents ages 18 to 20 to avoid 
confounding from laws that raised the minimum age for tobacco and nicotine sales to 21 during 
our study period (Winickoff, Gottlieb, and Mello 2014). Second, we drop responses from 
Alaskans because of limited geographical information, even in the restricted versions of these 
files that we use; full details are available on request. On a related note, the years of data differ 
across our smoking and vaping outcomes based on data availability in the BRFSS and the NHIS. 
We use 2011 to 2017 for our smoking outcomes in both data sources. For our vaping outcomes, 
we use 2014 to 2017 in the NHIS and 2016 to 2017 in the BRFSS; these are the years for which 
we have vaping information.  
We create harmonized demographic variables, which we include in our empirical models, 
across the two data sources. We include the following individual-level control variables in our 
regressions: sex (female and male), education (less than high school, high school or GED, some 
college, college or more, and missing), race (white, black, Asian, Native American/Alaskan 
Native, other, and missing), marital status (married, divorced, widowed, separated, never 
married, and missing), age, health insurance status (insured, not insured, and missing), 
employment (currently employed, not currently employed, and missing), and income.  
While most variables in the data sources are similar, an exception is income information. 
The BRFSS collects household income while the NHIS collects personal income. We account for 
11 
 
this difference as follows. Separately for each data source, we convert the categories into a 
pseudo-continuous variable and then impute missing values using state-year means. We control 
for the differences in income across data source by interacting the harmonized income variable 
with an indicator for data source. We also control for separate indicators for the top income 
category, the amounts of which vary across the data sources. Our results are insensitive to 
including/excluding income as a control variable; regression results without income as a control 
are not shown but are available on request.  
We obtain dates of state cigarette excise tax changes from the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (2019). We also obtain sub-state traditional cigarette excise tax changes 
affecting localities with 100,000 people or more using proprietary data obtained from the 
American Non-Smokers Rights Foundation. Effective dates of e-cigarette taxes are from the 
CDC State System (2019) and the Vapor Products Tax Data Center (2018).  
Appendix table 1 lists the localities that changed their traditional cigarette tax rate from 
2011 to 2017, and appendix table 2 lists localities that levied an e-cigarette tax by the end of 
2017. Figures 1 and 2 depict these taxes graphically, and figures 3 and 4 report the number of 
traditional cigarette changes and e-cigarette tax adoptions in each year of our study period. While 
there is some clustering of higher traditional cigarette taxes in the West and the Northeast, we do 
have reasonable variation in these taxes across the country. In terms of e-cigarette tax adoption, 
there is no obvious clustering in specific geographic areas and we observe adopting localities in 
all four regions of the country. Traditional cigarette tax changes are relatively homogenous 
across years, while e-cigarette tax adoptions are more concentrated in the latter half of the study 
period.  
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While traditional cigarette excise taxes are standardized across localities (i.e., a dollar 
value per pack of 20 traditional cigarettes), localities levy e-cigarette taxes in different ways. Of 
the 11 localities levying an e-cigarette tax by the end of 2017, five use an ad valorem tax on the 
wholesaler, five use an excise tax, and one uses a sales tax.9 Given the difficulty of comparing 
the magnitudes of these different types of taxes, our regression models simply use an indicator 
for whether or not a locality has levied an e-cigarette tax. We note this variable construction as a 
limitation of the study.  
We also control for several time-varying area-level factors in our regression models: 
county-level percent of the population covered by indoor vaping restrictions in bars, restaurants, 
and private workplaces (Cooper and Pesko 2017); state-level bans on smoking in restaurants, 
private workplaces, or bars (separate indicators) (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
2019); beer taxes (National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism 2019); medical 
marijuana laws (Sabia and Nguyen 2018); marijuana decriminalization laws (Pacula, Chriqui, 
and King 2003);10 prescription drug monitoring programs (Ali et al. 2017); Affordable Care Act 
Medicaid expansion status (Maclean, Pesko, and Hill 2019); and unemployment rate (University 
of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research 2019). All monetary values are consumer price index-
adjusted to 2010 dollars. We link all area-level variables to the combined BRFSS and NHIS data 
set using year/quarter and county/state information available in both data sources.  
Descriptive statistics for both data sources combined are presented in table 1, and 
separately for the BRFSS and the NHIS in appendix tables 3 and 4, respectively. For each table, 
variable means are presented separately for all respondents, for respondents residing in localities 
                                                          
9 Both Chicago and Cook County adopted an e-cigarette tax. We assume that the earlier tax in Chicago affected all 
of Cook County, since we cannot separate Chicago residents from residents of the rest of Cook County in our data. 
10 We thank Rosalie Pacula for sharing an updated version of the marijuana decriminalization variable with us. 
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that had not levied an e-cigarette tax by the end of 2017, and for respondents residing in 
localities that had levied such a tax by the end of 2017. Overall, 15.8 percent of respondents use 
traditional cigarettes, 11.4 percent of respondents use traditional cigarettes daily, 3.1 percent of 
respondents use e-cigarettes, and 1.1 percent use e-cigarettes every day. The share of respondents 
residing in a locality that had adopted an e-cigarette tax by 2017 is 6.3 percent.  
Among respondents residing in localities adopting an e-cigarette tax, current traditional 
cigarette use is 0.1 percentage points higher and current e-cigarette use is 0.2 percentage points 
lower than use rates among respondents residing in localities not adopting such a tax. Localities 
adopting e-cigarettes taxes are more racially and ethnically diverse, younger, and lower income 
that nonadopting localities. The localities adopting e-cigarette taxes also have lower traditional 
cigarette and beer taxes and more restrictions on marijuana use (both recreational and medical). 
While there are some differences in policies and demographics across groups, they do not appear 
to be substantial. Moreover, we control for these differences in all regression models. 
 
4. Methods 
We estimate difference-in-differences regression-style models. Specifically, we estimate the 
regression model outlined in equation (1): 
𝑌𝑖,𝑐,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽𝑇𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐,𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜕𝐸𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐,𝑠,𝑡 + 𝑍𝑐,𝑠,𝑡∅ + 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑠,𝑡𝜃 + ɣ𝑐,𝑠 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐,𝑠,𝑡                (1) 
In this equation, i indexes an individual interviewed in year-quarter t, who resides in county c of 
state s. 𝑌𝑖,𝑐,𝑠,𝑡 is an indicator for whether the individual smokes, smokes every day, vapes, or 
vapes every day. 𝑍𝑐,𝑠,𝑡 includes the time-varying state- or county-level policies. 𝑋𝑖,𝑐,𝑠,𝑡 includes 
demographics, an indicator for whether the observation was surveyed in the BRFSS or the NHIS, 
and an interaction between data source and income. We control for county fixed effects (ɣ𝑐,𝑠), 
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which mitigate potential bias from time-invariant, county-specific factors. Note that county fixed 
effects incorporate state fixed effects. Including these fixed effects allows us to leverage within-
locality (county or state) variation in tobacco and e-cigarette taxes for identification of treatment 
effects. We also control for year-quarter fixed effects (𝜏𝑡) that account for time varying factors 
affecting the nation as a whole, such as the general decline in smoking and the sharp increase in 
e-cigarette popularity that occurred over our study period. 
𝛽 and 𝜕 are our primary coefficients of interest; they capture the effect of tobacco and e-
cigarette taxes on our outcomes. We expect own taxes will reduce current use of these products, 
but the cross-tax effects are a priori ambiguous. Cross-tax effects will be positive if the goods 
are substitutes, negative if the goods are complements, and zero if the goods are unrelated. As 
discussed in section 2, the literature has not yet reached consensus on whether these products are 
complements or substitutes among adults, although most studies to date suggest they are 
substitutes.  
A necessary assumption for the difference-in-differences model to recover causal 
estimates is that the treatment group (i.e., localities changing traditional cigarette taxes or 
adopting e-cigarette taxes) and the comparison group (i.e., localities not changing traditional 
cigarette taxes or adopting e-cigarette taxes) would have followed the same trend in the post-
treatment period had the treatment localities not been treated (i.e., had they not changed the 
traditional cigarette tax or adopted an e-cigarette tax). This assumption is referred to as “parallel 
trends.” Clearly this assumption is untestable as treated localities were treated in the post-period, 
preventing us from observing counterfactual trends. Instead, we follow the economics literature 
and provide suggestive evidence on whether the parallel trends assumption is satisfied in our data 
by modifying equation (1) to conduct an event study (Autor 2003).  
15 
 
To implement the event study, we replace the traditional cigarette tax rate with an 
indicator variable for if the traditional cigarette tax increased by $0.50 or more at any point 
during the study period following; we refer to such a change as a large traditional cigarette tax 
increase (Callison and Kaestner 2014).11 For both the large traditional cigarette tax increase and 
e-cigarette tax adoption variables, we create mutually exclusive policy lead variables for more 
than two years in advance and for two to more than one year in advance of the tax. We include 
one lag indicator for the post period. The omitted category is the year prior to the tax adoption 
(one to more than zero years).12 We code all nonadopting localities as zero for all event-time 
indicators (Lovenheim 2009). All other variables are as defined in equation (1). If the policy lead 
coefficients are small in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable from zero, this pattern of 
results suggests that there were no changes in smoking or vaping before the policy’s adoption. 
Such results can be interpreted as providing suggestive evidence that a covariate-adjusted version 
of the parallel trends assumption is met and that our difference-in-differences models can recover 
causal estimates.  
To further assess the validity of our design, we follow Pei, Pischke, and Schwandt (2018) 
and test for balance across treatment and comparison groups by separately regressing traditional 
cigarette and e-cigarette taxes on all covariates in equation (1); we aggregate demographic 
variables to the county level. If the covariates are uncorrelated with our tax variables, we can 
interpret this finding as providing suggestive evidence that treatment and comparison groups are 
conditionally balanced and that our data satisfy the conditional independence assumption (CIA).  
                                                          
11 Eleven states passed a cigarette excise tax increase of ≥ $0.50 during the study period, and no states passed more 
than two such increases. Due to local taxes, both Cook County and Philadelphia County had more than one $0.50 
excise tax increase. In those cases, we study trends before the first large increase. 
12 We exclude three states (Illinois, Massachusetts, and Minnesota) that passed large cigarette tax increases from 
2011 to 2013 to ensure that our policy lead coefficients are not reflecting any compositional effects in the population 
of tobacco product users. This exclusion also removes the only locality passing an early e-cigarette tax and is 
therefore a treated control. Minnesota passed an e-cigarette tax in 2010, before our study period. 
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We also test whether the adoption of an e-cigarette tax alters traditional cigarette tax 
responsiveness. The relatively new availability of e-cigarettes offers smokers another option for 
smoking cessation, and recent clinical trial evidence suggests that e-cigarettes are an effective 
option for some smokers (Hajek et al. 2019). On the one hand, higher traditional cigarette taxes 
could therefore result in a steeper decline in smoking if people who would otherwise not quit in 
the absence of e-cigarettes now do so, implying that traditional cigarette tax responsiveness may 
be larger in recent years as e-cigarettes have become widely available and the potential of these 
products as smoking cessation devices has become better understood. On the other hand, e-
cigarette taxes could reduce individuals’ ability to purchase these products, restricting options to 
quit smoking and leading to a smaller traditional cigarette own-tax elasticity. To explore this 
hypothesis, we estimate a version of equation (1) that includes an interaction between the 
traditional cigarette tax rate and e-cigarette tax adoption variables. As documented in appendix 
tables 1 and 2, most localities adopting an e-cigarette tax also implemented changes to their 
traditional cigarette tax rate during the study period, providing researchers useful variation to 
explore the effect of traditional cigarette taxes in localities with and without an e-cigarette tax.  
We estimate unweighted linear probability models. We cluster standard errors at the level 
of the state (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004); we use both county- and state-level 
variation in taxes and thus the most appropriate level at which to cluster is unclear. In unreported 
analyses, we have clustered at the county level and the results are similar.  
 
5. Results 
 
5.1 Effects of traditional cigarette and e-cigarette taxes on adult tobacco product use 
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Our main difference-in-differences results are reported in table 2 for all individuals in both data 
sources. We also report results generated in the BFRSS only (table 3) and the NHIS only (table 
4). A $1.00 increase in the traditional cigarette tax reduces current traditional cigarette use by 0.3 
percentage points and everyday traditional cigarette use by 0.4 percentage points, which 
represents a 1.9 percent and 3.5 percent reduction compared to the smoking rates in the sample. 
Given a mean traditional cigarette state excise tax rate of $1.45, these estimates imply a modest 
own-tax elasticity of demand of –0.03 for current smoking and –0.05 for daily smoking. Our 
modest tax elasticity estimates are in line with those of Callison and Kaestner (2014), who report 
elasticities of –0.03 to –0.06. We note, however, that our elasticities are lower than other recent 
estimates of –0.15 to –0.18 (Cotti, Nesson, and Tefft 2016; Nesson 2017; Bishop 2018). In sum, 
we do not find evidence that traditional cigarette tax responsiveness is greater as e-cigarettes 
become more available.  
A $1.00 traditional cigarette excise tax increase also increases current vaping by 0.3 
percentage points (9.7% of the mean) and everyday vaping by 0.1 percentage points (11.1% of 
the mean), suggesting that the two products are economic substitutes. We do not find any 
evidence that e-cigarette taxes influence traditional cigarette use, however. These findings depart 
from previous work using scanner data (see section 2). We suspect that we are potentially 
underpowered to detect these effects. For instance, five times more people report current 
smoking than current vaping in our data, which implies that the vaping market is much smaller. 
All else equal, the researcher is more likely to detect statistically significant effects of a tax 
change when the market is larger,13 which could explain why we were able to measure 
                                                          
13 As an example, imagine a hypothetical market in which 50% of individuals purchase product A and 10% of 
individuals purchase closely related product B. Further, the cross-tax elasticity of demand for both products is 0.1. A 
10% increase in the tax on product A would therefore increase consumption of product B by five percentage points 
(50%), whereas a 10% increase in the tax on product B would increase consumption of product A by only one 
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statistically significant increases in the effect of cigarette taxes on e-cigarette use but not the 
reverse. We suspect that over time, given trends in e-cigarette use, the market will increase and 
future studies will provide more insight on this question. Nonetheless, given the regulatory 
action on the part of numerous US localities, providing an early evaluation of e-cigarette taxation 
effects is important and useful.  
Adoption of an e-cigarette tax leads to a 0.2 percentage point (6.5%) reduction in vaping, 
but this estimate is not statistically significant. However, in looking strictly at the BRFSS data in 
table 3, we find that adoption of an e-cigarette tax reduces current e-cigarette use by 0.3 
percentage points (9.7%), and this estimate is statistically distinguishable from zero. The NHIS 
data in table 4 suggest a 0.2 percentage point decrease in e-cigarette use, which is nearly 
identical in magnitude to what we observe in the BRFSS, although like in our combined sample, 
this estimate is not statistically significant.  
While we cannot fully explore why estimates are more precise in the BRFSS than in the 
combined BRFSS and NHIS or NHIS datasets, one possibility is that the data sources use 
somewhat different sources of variation. E-cigarette questions were added to the BRFSS in 2016 
and to the NHIS in 2014. Later e-cigarette taxes (and changes in these taxes for early adopters, 
since several early adopters later changed the rate) could plausibly have been more impactful 
than earlier taxes. Appendix table 2 provides some suggestive support for this hypothesis. 
Several tax changes contribute to the identifying variation in the NHIS sample years but not the 
BRFSS sample years, including those in Washington, DC; Montgomery County, Maryland; 
Louisiana; and North Carolina. The e-cigarette taxes levied by these early adopters appear 
smaller than taxes levied by later adopting localities. In particular, the $0.05 excise tax per fluid 
                                                          
percentage point (2%). Therefore, it is much easier in this illustrative case to detect statistically significant product A 
cross-tax effects than product B cross-tax effects. 
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milliliter in Louisiana and North Carolina is smaller than all subsequently enacted initial excise 
tax levels. 
The results in table 4 (which rely exclusively on the NHIS) suggest larger effects of taxes 
on traditional cigarette use. For example, a $1.00 increase in traditional cigarette taxes reduces 
current traditional cigarette use by 0.8 percentage points (4.5%) and adoption of an e-cigarette 
tax increases current traditional cigarette use by 0.4 percentage points (2.3%). While this latter 
result is not statistically significant, the point estimate suggests substitution. However, these 
taxes have little effect on e-cigarette use in the NHIS data. 
 
5.2 Internal validity of the research design 
In table 5, we report estimates and associated standard errors for our tobacco and e-cigarette use 
outcomes generated using our event study. The reference period is the year immediately prior to 
adoption of a large traditional cigarette tax increase and adoption of an e-cigarette tax. For both 
the large traditional cigarette tax and e-cigarette tax adoption leads, coefficient estimates are 
statistically indistinguishable from zero and small in magnitude. We interpret these null findings 
to suggest that our data are potentially able to satisfy a covariate-adjusted version of the parallel 
trends assumption. Compared to the year immediately prior to large traditional cigarette excise-
tax adoption, such an increase in this tax reduced everyday traditional cigarette use by 0.3 
percentage points and increased current vaping by 0.4 percentage points.  
We also assess the ability of our data to satisfy the conditional independence assumption 
by following Pei, Pischke, and Schwandt (2018) and regressing both taxes on all other right-hand 
side variables. In results not shown, but available on request, we observe that demographics do 
not predict cigarette tax rates or e-cigarette tax adoption, suggesting that individuals do not 
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migrate in observable ways in response to changes in tobacco taxation. Tobacco control policies 
and medical marijuana laws do predict the traditional cigarette tax rate. Given that these policies 
all attempt to regulate addictive substances, the observed correlations may reflect overall 
strategies adopted by localities to reduce substance use. Under the hypothesis of an overall 
strategy adopted by a locality, these correlations are potentially not unexpected. In terms of e-
cigarette adoption, only the traditional cigarette rate predicts this outcome, which plausibly 
reflects localities adopting broader tobacco control efforts to reduce nicotine consumption 
(Maclean et al. 2018). We acknowledge that our data display some evidence of policy 
imbalance—in particular, in terms of regulation of related goods—but we are able to control for 
all variables in our regression models.  
 
5.3 Heterogeneity in tax effects on adult tobacco product use 
In tables 6, 7, and 8, we explore whether subgroups differ in responsiveness to these taxes. Given 
differences in use of these products (Wang et al. 2018) and perceptions regarding their health 
harms (Glasser et al. 2017), tax responsiveness may also vary. For both men and adults younger 
than 35, we document similar traditional cigarette tax effects. A $1.00 increase in the traditional 
cigarette tax reduces current and daily smoking and increases current e-cigarette use by 0.6 
percentage points. This tax hike also increases daily vaping by 0.2 percentage points. E-cigarette 
tax adoption, however, reduces current e-cigarette use by approximately 0.6 percentage points 
for both populations. Women do not appear to change their smoking or vaping patterns following 
traditional cigarette tax rate changes or e-cigarette tax adoption.  
 
5.4 Interactions between traditional cigarette and e-cigarette taxes 
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In tables 9 and 10, we report results from our interactive model (i.e., interacting the traditional 
cigarette tax with an indicator for e-cigarette tax adoption). This specification allows us to 
explore if e-cigarette tax adoption alters traditional cigarette tax responsiveness by reducing the 
financial incentive to use e-cigarettes. We explore the effect on both current and daily traditional 
cigarette use for all respondents and for subgroups defined by sex and age.  
The traditional cigarette tax main effect captures traditional cigarette tax responsiveness 
in the absence of an e-cigarette tax. Summing the traditional cigarette tax coefficient and the 
interaction coefficient estimates reveals traditional cigarette tax responsiveness in the presence of 
an e-cigarette tax. If the interaction coefficient estimate is positive, this pattern of results can be 
interpreted to imply that a traditional cigarette tax hike reduces traditional cigarette use to a 
lesser degree than if the e-cigarette tax had not been adopted.  
For current traditional cigarette use in table 9, the interaction term is positive for all 
groups, although it only reaches statistical significance for men. For everyday traditional 
cigarette use in table 10, the coefficient estimate on the interaction term is statistically significant 
and positive for all groups. These results collectively suggest that adoption of an e-cigarette tax 
dilutes traditional cigarette tax responsiveness. For example, the ratio of the traditional cigarette 
tax main effect coefficient estimate to the interaction term coefficient estimate, for daily smoking 
among all respondents, suggests that e-cigarette tax adoption reduces approximately two-thirds 
of the effect that traditional cigarette taxes would have on daily smoking absent an e-cigarette 
tax. However, the e-cigarette tax main effect is negative and roughly the same magnitude as the 
interaction coefficient. This finding suggests that only once the traditional cigarette excise tax 
exceeds $1.00 does an e-cigarette tax begin to reduce traditional cigarette tax responsiveness. 
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6. Discussion 
In this paper, we provide the first evidence on the effects of traditional cigarette taxes on 
traditional cigarette use and e-cigarette use in a period when e-cigarettes were widely available in 
tobacco markets, and the effects of e-cigarette taxes on these outcomes. To do so, we combine 
data from two large-scale surveys, the BRFSS and the NHIS, and detailed information on state 
and county traditional cigarette and e-cigarette taxes with a difference-in-differences design. 
Overall, we observe that, as previous studies estimating traditional cigarette demand equations 
have documented, smoking declines when traditional cigarette tax rates increase. We also find 
evidence that adults are more likely to use e-cigarettes when traditional cigarette taxes rise, 
which mirrors evidence from retail sales data using variation in e-cigarette prices (Zheng et al. 
2017; Stoklosa, Drope, and Chaloupka 2016). We observe some evidence that adoption of an e-
cigarette tax reduces vaping, but this finding is somewhat sensitive to sample definition and sub-
group. In particular, evidence gleaned from the BRFSS only suggests that e-cigarette use 
propensity declines post-e-cigarette tax adoption, but not in our combined data set or the NHIS in 
isolation. Regardless of the data source, we observe that men reduce their e-cigarette use 
following an e-cigarette tax adoption. Finally, traditional cigarette taxes appear to be less 
effective in reducing smoking when a locality has also adopted an e-cigarette tax.  
The finding that e-cigarette adoption appears to dilute the effectiveness of traditional 
cigarette taxes, which are a standard policy lever to reduce smoking, is important from both an 
economic and a practical standpoint. We hypothesize that adoption of an e-cigarette tax increases 
the price of a potential smoking cessation device (Hajek et al. 2019), which dissuades some 
smokers from attempting to quit or reduce smoking by taking up vaping in response to a 
traditional cigarette tax increase. Indeed, traditional smoking cessation devices (e.g., Food and 
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Drug Administration-approved nicotine replacement therapies such as Zyban, Chantix, or 
Nicotrol) are expensive (Maclean, Pesko, and Hill 2019), particularly without insurance, and 
may not be feasible for smokers, who on average have lower incomes (Remler 2004). Moreover, 
e-cigarettes are perceived as effective smoking cessation devices, and more effective than 
traditional smoking cessation options among some groups of smokers (Glasser et al. 2017; 
Harrell et al. 2014). Therefore, when the price of e-cigarettes increases after a tax is adopted, 
smokers may be less likely to attempt to stop smoking (Saffer et al. 2018) or to reduce smoking. 
Overall, without speaking to specific pathways, this finding suggests that the combination of a 
traditional cigarette tax hike and an e-cigarette tax prevents smokers from quitting or switching 
to a less harmful product. Both actions would improve smokers’ health by minimizing exposure 
to carcinogens and other toxins contained in traditional cigarettes.  
From the policymaker’s perspective, understanding policy interactions is important for 
developing effective strategies to achieve social goals. Previous economic studies have, for 
example, documented policy spillovers in the context of Medicaid (Burns and Dague 2017), 
minimum wages (Page, Spetz, and Millar 2005), workers compensation (McInerney and Simon 
2012), and medical marijuana laws (Bradford and Bradford 2018). Failure to consider such 
potential spillovers can lead to suboptimal policies.  
We suspect that our focus on (primarily) the extensive margins of traditional cigarette 
and e-cigarette use likely leads us to understate the tax effects. That is, following a traditional 
cigarette tax hike or the adoption of an e-cigarette tax, some individuals may reduce the quantity 
demanded on the intensive margin (e.g., the number of traditional cigarettes smoked or e-
cigarettes vaped per day) but not quit completely. While we do examine daily smoking and 
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vaping, we are unable to fully capture this margin given the information available in both data 
sources.  
Our findings depart from those of a seminal and related study. Whereas we document that 
traditional cigarettes and e-cigarettes are substitutes, Cotti, Nesson, and Tefft (2018) provide 
evidence of complementarity between the two products. Our data do not allow us to fully explore 
differences in findings, but we can propose potential hypotheses.  
First, our data set encompasses more recent changes. Cotti, Nesson, and Tefft (2018) use 
data from 2011 to 2015. Our data set includes 2016 and 2017, when nine additional localities—
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana, Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
and West Virginia—increased their traditional cigarette excise taxes. These localities are 
different from the localities that passed such taxes from 2011 to 2015. In particular, California is 
a treatment state in our study because its legislators enacted a cigarette tax increase in April 
2017. But this populous state with a historically strong tobacco-control program was a control 
locality during the period investigated by Cotti, Nesson, and Tefft (2018).  
Second, the studies have important differences in measures of e-cigarette use.14 In the 
scanner data, Cotti, Nesson, and Tefft (2018) document that 9.5 percent of households report 
purchasing traditional cigarettes over the last quarter, compared to 15.8 percent that report 
currently smoking in our data. Thus, current reported smoking is 66 percent more common than 
the percent of households that report purchasing traditional cigarettes. One potential explanation 
for this difference is that smokers may cluster in the same households, which would understate 
the smoking rate. For example, Sterba et al. (2011) survey partnered smokers who called a 
quitline (a phone counseling service to help smokers quit); 54.1 percent of callers report that 
                                                          
14 Differences exist but are much smaller across the data sources for traditional cigarette use. 
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their partner also smokes. Further, in the scanner data, 0.3 percent of households report 
purchasing e-cigarettes, while we find that 3.1 percent of respondents in our combined BRFSS 
and NHIS sample currently vape. Thus, our vaping rate is 10 times the rate implied by Cotti, 
Nesson, and Tefft (2018) and likely well outside the range that could be explained by a 
clustering of people that vape in the same household. We suspect that the particularly large 
difference between reported use and purchasing of e-cigarettes is driven by purchases without a 
UPC code, such as e-liquids from specialty mix shops. These purchases do not appear in the 
scanner data but are captured in our overall use measures. Individuals purchasing e-liquids 
without UPC codes may have different cross-tax elasticities than individuals purchasing e-liquids 
with UPC codes, and so including these individuals may account for differences between 
household scanner data and survey data.  
Our study has limitations. First, because e-cigarette questions have only recently been 
added to large-scale health surveys, we have limited data on e-cigarette use. Second, while we 
can measure daily smoking and vaping, we cannot, with the information collected in our data 
sources, fully examine effects on the extensive margin of tobacco product use. As noted earlier, 
this data feature likely leads us to understate tax effects. Third, we rely on self-reported 
traditional cigarette and e-cigarette use, which may be measured with some error. Fourth, due to 
substantial heterogeneity in how localities have adopted e-cigarette taxes, and no obvious way to 
standardize these taxes, we include an indicator for a tax rather than a tax rate, as is common in 
economic analyses of traditional cigarettes.  
Finally, we note that our data sources are not representative at the level of treatment for 
all traditional cigarette tax changes and e-cigarette tax adoptions that occurred during our study 
period. For example, some of the policy changes we leverage occurred at the sub-state level (city 
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or county) and our data sources are not representative at that level, which can lead to empirical 
issues (Maclean, Tello-Trillo, and Webber 2019). We believe that our ability to combine two 
large data sources may mitigate this issue, but we acknowledge that ideally we would have 
access to data that are representative at the level of treatment for all included localities.  
Our research contributes further evidence (from difference-in-differences methods) that 
regulating e-cigarettes has the unintended consequence of raising traditional cigarette use. While 
neither product is harmless, the clinical literature strongly suggests that e-cigarettes are the less 
harmful product. With few exceptions (Abouk and Adams 2017; Cotti, Nesson, and Tefft 2018), 
this finding has been documented for youth (Dave, Feng, and Pesko 2019; Pesko, Hughes, and 
Faisal 2016; Pesko and Currie 2019; Friedman 2015), pregnant women (Cooper and Pesko 2017; 
Pesko and Currie 2019), and now, for the first time, for adults. These results suggest caution in 
regulating e-cigarettes because e-cigarette regulations may have a harmful, unintended 
consequence: increased smoking of traditional cigarettes. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics among respondents in all localities, and localities that did and did not adopt an e-
cigarette tax by 2017: Combined BRFSS and NHIS data, 2011–2017 
Sample 
All  
localities 
Adopting 
localities 
Nonadopting 
localities 
Outcomes    
Smoking 0.158 0.158 0.159 
Daily smoking 0.114 0.114 0.114 
Vaping 0.031 0.031 0.029 
Daily vaping 0.011 0.011 0.010 
Traditional cigarette and e-cigarette taxes    
Traditional cigarette tax rate ($ per pack) 1.445 (0.925) 1.493 (0.949) 1.249 (0.791) 
E-cigarette tax (any) 0.063 0.000 0.320 
Area-level controls    
Restaurant smoking ban 0.684 0.694 0.643 
Private workplace smoking ban 0.690 0.696 0.668 
Bar smoking ban 0.573 0.574 0.569 
Indoor vaping restrictions (% population) 0.137 (0.318) 0.137 (0.320) 0.138 (0.307) 
Beer tax ($ per gallon) 0.236 (0.200) 0.253 (0.215) 0.170 (0.098) 
Medical marijuana law 0.411 0.418 0.380 
Marijuana decriminalized 0.333 0.356 0.241 
Prescription drug monitoring program 0.949 0.946 0.961 
ACA-Medicaid expansion 0.313 0.308 0.333 
Unemployment rate (%) 6.027 (2.032) 5.923 (1.990) 6.455 (2.143) 
Individual-level controls    
Female 0.587 0.590 0.574 
Male 0.413 0.410 0.426 
Less than high school 0.088 0.087 0.098 
High school or GED 0.279 0.283 0.261 
Some college 0.273 0.275 0.265 
College degree or more 0.353 0.350 0.368 
Education missing 0.006 0.006 0.007 
White 0.828 0.834 0.801 
African American 0.093 0.089 0.111 
Asian 0.022 0.018 0.039 
Native American or Alaskan 0.019 0.020 0.015 
Other race 0.022 0.022 0.022 
Race missing 0.016 0.018 0.011 
Married 0.540 0.542 0.533 
Divorced 0.138 0.140 0.131 
Widowed 0.125 0.128 0.112 
Separated 0.022 0.021 0.023 
Never married 0.169 0.163 0.195 
Marital status missing 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Age (years) 55.08 (16.69) 55.46 (16.63) 53.52 (16.86) 
Uninsured 0.099 0.098 0.105 
Insured 0.897 0.898 0.891 
Insurance missing 0.004 0.004 0.005 
Income ($; missing values imputed) 42,975 (25,879) 43,075 (25,689) 42,564 (26,636) 
Unemployed or not in labor force 0.482 0.488 0.456 
Employed 0.511 0.504 0.536 
Employment missing 0.007 0.007 0.008 
Observations 3,637,821 2,921,762 716,059 
Notes: Data are unweighted. The unit of observation is an individual in a county in a year. Standard deviations for 
continuous variables are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 2. Effects of traditional cigarette and e-cigarette taxes on smoking and vaping outcomes among adults 
using a difference-in-differences-style model: Combined BRFSS and NHIS data, 2011–2017 
Outcome Smoking Daily smoking Vaping Daily vaping 
Traditional cigarette tax rate  -0.003*** -0.004*** 0.003** 0.001*** 
($ per 20 unit pack) [-0.006,-0.001] [-0.006,-0.002] [0.001,0.006] [0.000,0.002] 
E-cigarette tax (any) 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
 [-0.003,0.004] [-0.004,0.002] [-0.005,0.001] [-0.002,0.001] 
Observations 3,263,753 3,261,037 969,659 969,350 
Proportion of outcome variable 0.158 0.114 0.031 0.011 
Number of clusters 50 50 50 50 
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual in a county in a year. Data are unweighted. Models are estimated 
with a linear probability model and control for area-level and individual-level variables reported in table 1, county 
fixed effects, and quarter-by-year fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals account for within-state correlations and 
are reported in square brackets.  
***, **, and * = statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.  
 
Table 3. Effects of traditional cigarette and e-cigarette taxes on smoking and vaping outcomes among adults 
using a difference-in-differences-style model: BRFSS data, 2011–2017 
Outcome Smoking Daily smoking Vaping Daily vaping 
Traditional cigarette tax rate  -0.003** -0.003*** 0.004*** 0.001** 
($ per 20-unit pack) [-0.005,-0.000] [-0.005,-0.002] [0.002,0.006] [0.000,0.002] 
E-cigarette tax (any) 0.000 -0.001 -0.003** -0.000 
 [-0.003,0.004] [-0.004,0.002] [-0.005,-0.001] [-0.001,0.000] 
Observations 3,043,140 3,040,492 847,858 847,553 
Proportion of outcome variable 0.157 0.112 0.031 0.011 
Number of clusters 50 50 50 50 
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual in a county in a year. Data are unweighted. Models are estimated 
with a linear probability model and control for area-level and individual-level variables reported in table 1, county 
fixed effects, and quarter-by-year fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals account for within-state correlations and 
are reported in square brackets.  
***, **, and * = statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
Table 4. Effects of traditional cigarette and e-cigarette taxes on smoking and vaping outcomes among adults 
using a difference-in-differences-style model: NHIS data, 2011–2017 
Outcome Smoking Daily smoking Vaping Daily vaping 
Traditional cigarette tax rate  -0.008** -0.007** 0.001 0.001 
($ per 20-unit pack) [-0.015,-0.000] [-0.013,-0.001] [-0.004,0.006] [-0.002,0.005] 
E-cigarette tax (any) 0.004 0.005 -0.002 0.001 
 [-0.008,0.016] [-0.007,0.016] [-0.010,0.006] [-0.005,0.007] 
Observations 220,613 220,545 121,801 121,797 
Proportion of outcome variable 0.176 0.135 0.031 0.011 
Number of clusters 50 50 50 50 
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual in a county in a year. Data are unweighted. Models are estimated 
with a linear probability model and control for area-level and individual-level variables reported in table 1, county 
fixed effects, and quarter-by-year fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals account for within state correlations and 
are reported in square brackets.  
***, **, and * = statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.  
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Table 5. Effects of traditional cigarette and e-cigarette taxes on smoking and vaping outcomes among adults 
using an event-study style model: Combined BRFSS and NHIS data, 2011–2017 
Outcome Smoking Daily smoking Vaping Daily vaping 
Large traditional cigarette tax indicators     
2+ years in advance of large tax increase 0.003 0.003 0.004 -0.003 
 [-0.004,0.010] [-0.002,0.008] [-0.003,0.011] [-0.007,0.002] 
[2,1) years in advance of large tax increase 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.002 
 [-0.001,0.008] [-0.004,0.009] [-0.004,0.011] [-0.007,0.004] 
[1,0) years in advance of large tax increase -- -- -- -- 
(reference) -- -- -- -- 
Tax increase -0.000 -0.003** 0.004** 0.001 
 [-0.004,0.004] [-0.006,-0.000] [0.000,0.008] [-0.002,0.004] 
E-cigarette tax indicators     
2+ years in advance of tax adoption -0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.001 
 [-0.007,0.004] [-0.004,0.005] [-0.010,0.002] [-0.004,0.003] 
[2,1) years in advance of tax adoption -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 -0.002 
 [-0.006,0.004] [-0.005,0.005] [-0.010,0.002] [-0.006,0.002] 
[1,0) years in advance of tax adoption -- -- -- -- 
(reference) -- -- -- -- 
Tax adoption -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 -0.000 
 [-0.006,0.002] [-0.005,0.004] [-0.006,0.001] [-0.003,0.002] 
Observations 3,016,967 3,014,425 906,116 905,826 
Proportion of outcome variable 0.159 0.115 0.031 0.011 
Number of clusters 47 47 47 47 
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual in a county in a year. Data are unweighted. Models are estimated 
with a linear probability model and control for area-level and individual-level variables reported in table 1, county 
fixed effects, and quarter-by-year fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals account for within-state correlations and 
are reported in square brackets. The omitted category is the year prior to the policy adoption. A large traditional 
cigarette tax hike is defined as an increase of ≥$0.50. All nonadopting localities are coded as zero for all event-time 
indicators. Illinois, Massachusetts, and Minnesota are excluded; see text for details.  
***, **, and * = statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
Table 6. Effects of traditional cigarette and e-cigarette taxes on smoking and vaping outcomes among adults 
using a difference-in-differences-style model among males: Combined BRFSS and NHIS data, 2011–2017 
Outcome Smoking Daily smoking Vaping Daily vaping 
Traditional cigarette tax rate  -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.005*** 0.002** 
($ per 20-unit pack) [-0.010,-0.002] [-0.008,-0.003] [0.002,0.008] [0.000,0.004] 
E-cigarette tax (any) 0.000 -0.000 -0.005** 0.000 
 [-0.005,0.006] [-0.005,0.005] [-0.009,-0.001] [-0.002,0.002] 
Observations 1,356,202 1,354,866 422,839 422,657 
Proportion of outcome variable 0.175 0.126 0.036 0.013 
Number of clusters 50 50 50 50 
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual in a county in a year. Data are unweighted. Models are estimated 
with a linear probability model and control for area-level and individual-level variables reported in table 1, county 
fixed effects, and quarter-by-year fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals account for within-state correlations and 
are reported in square brackets.  
***, **, and * = statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.  
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Table 7. Effects of traditional cigarette and e-cigarette taxes on smoking and vaping outcomes among adults 
using a difference-in-differences-style model among females: Combined BRFSS and NHIS data, 2011–2017 
Outcome Smoking Daily smoking Vaping Daily vaping 
Traditional cigarette tax rate  -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.001 
($ per 20-unit pack) [-0.005,0.002] [-0.005,0.001] [-0.002,0.005] [-0.001,0.002] 
E-cigarette tax (any) 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 [-0.005,0.005] [-0.004,0.002] [-0.004,0.004] [-0.002,0.000] 
Observations 1,907,267 1,905,887 546,537 546,410 
Proportion of outcome variable 0.147 0.105 0.027 0.009 
Number of clusters 50 50 50 50 
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual in a county in a year. Data are unweighted. Models are estimated 
with a linear probability model and control for area-level and individual-level variables reported in table 1, county 
fixed effects, and quarter-by-year fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals account for within-state correlations and 
are reported in square brackets.  
***, **, and * = statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
Table 8. Effects of traditional cigarette and e-cigarette taxes on smoking and vaping outcomes among adults 
using a difference-in-differences-style model among adults less than 35 years: Combined BRFSS and NHIS 
data 2011-2017 
Outcome Smoking Daily smoking Vaping Daily vaping 
Traditional cigarette tax rate  -0.005* -0.006** 0.006** 0.002 
($ per 20-unit pack) [-0.010,0.000] [-0.011,-0.001] [0.000,0.011] [-0.002,0.006] 
E-cigarette tax (any) -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 0.000 
 [-0.012,0.006] [-0.009,0.004] [-0.013,0.002] [-0.005,0.006] 
Observations 495,401 495,147 156,489 156,395 
Proportion of outcome variable 0.217 0.145 0.064 0.022 
Number of clusters 50 50 50 50 
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual in a county in a year. Data are unweighted. Models are estimated 
with a linear probability model and control for area-level and individual-level variables reported in table 1, county 
fixed effects, and quarter-by-year fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals account for within-state correlations and 
are reported in square brackets.  
***, **, and * = statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.  
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Table 9. Effects of traditional cigarette and e-cigarette taxes on any smoking among adults using a difference-
in-differences-style model including an interaction between the traditional cigarette tax rate and the indicator 
for an e-cigarette tax: Combined BRFSS and NHIS data, 2011–2017 
Sample Full sample Males Females < 35 years 
Traditional cigarette tax rate  -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.002 -0.007* 
($ per 20-unit pack) [-0.007,-0.001] [-0.013,-0.003] [-0.006,0.003] [-0.013,0.000] 
E-cigarette tax (any) -0.002 -0.006 -0.000 -0.007 
 [-0.007,0.004] [-0.014,0.002] [-0.009,0.009] [-0.020,0.007] 
Traditional cigarette tax rate ($)* 0.002 0.005* 0.000 0.003 
E-cigarette tax (any) [-0.001,0.005] [-0.000,0.010] [-0.005,0.005] [-0.005,0.010] 
Observations 3,263,753 1,356,202 1,907,267 495,401 
Proportion of outcome variable 0.158 0.175 0.147 0.217 
Number of clusters 50 50 50 50 
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual in a county in a year. Data are unweighted. Models are estimated 
with a linear probability model and control for area-level and individual-level variables reported in table 1, county 
fixed effects, and quarter-by-year fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals account for within-state correlations and 
are reported in square brackets.  
***, **, and * = statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
Table 10. Effects of traditional cigarette and e-cigarette taxes on daily smoking among adults using a 
difference-in-differences-style model including an interaction between the traditional cigarette tax rate and 
the indicator for an e-cigarette tax: Combined BRFSS and NHIS data, 2011–2017  
Sample Full sample Males Females < 35 years 
Traditional cigarette tax rate  -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.004* -0.009*** 
($ per 20-unit pack) [-0.008,-0.003] [-0.013,-0.004] [-0.008,0.000] [-0.015,-0.003] 
E-cigarette tax (any) -0.005*** -0.006* -0.005*** -0.010* 
 [-0.008,-0.002] [-0.014,0.001] [-0.008,-0.002] [-0.020,0.000] 
Traditional cigarette tax rate ($ per 20  0.004*** 0.005** 0.003* 0.006* 
unit pack)*E-cigarette tax (any) [0.001,0.006] [0.001,0.009] [-0.000,0.006] [-0.001,0.012] 
Observations 3,261,037 1,354,866 1,905,887 495,147 
Proportion of outcome variable 0.114 0.126 0.105 0.145 
Number of clusters 50 50 50 50 
Notes: The unit of observation is an individual in a county in a year. Data are unweighted. Models are estimated 
with a linear probability model and control for area-level and individual-level variables reported in table 1, county 
fixed effects, and quarter-by-year fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals account for within-state correlations and 
are reported in square brackets.  
***, **, and * = statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.  
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Figure 1. Geographic variation in locality traditional cigarette taxes, 2017 
 
Note: See text for details. 
 
 
Figure 2. Geographic variation in localities that adopted an e-cigarette tax by 2017 
 
Note: See text for details.  
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Figure 3. Traditional cigarette tax changes in each year, 2011–2017 
 
Notes: See text for details. 
 
Figure 4. E-cigarette tax adoptions in each year 2011 to 2017 
 
Note: See text for details.  
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Appendix table 1. Traditional cigarette tax changes, 2011–2017 
Locality Effective date Tax change amount* 
State   
Alabama 10/2015 $0.25 
California 4/2017 $2.00 
Connecticut 7/2011, 10/2015, 7/2016, 12/2017 $0.40, $0.25, $0.25, $0.45 
Delaware 9/2017 $0.50 
Hawaii 7/2011 $0.20 
Illinois 6/2012 $1.00 
Kansas 7/2015 $0.50 
Louisiana 7/2015, 4/2016 $0.50, $0.22 
Massachusetts 7/2013 $1.00 
Minnesota 7/2013, 1/2015, 1/2016, 1/2017 $1.60, $0.07, $0.10, $0.04 
New Hampshire 7/2011, 8/2013 -$0.10, $0.10, 
Ohio 7/2015 $0.35 
Oregon 1/2014, 1/2016 $0.13, $0.01 
Nevada 7/2015 $1.00 
Pennsylvania 8/2016 $1.00 
Rhode Island 7/2012, 8/2015, 8/2017 $0.04, $0.25, $0.50 
West Virginia 7/2016 $0.65 
Vermont 7/2011, 7/2014, 7/2015 $0.38, $0.13, $0.33 
County/City**   
Chicago, Illinois  1/2014 $0.50 
Cook County, Illinois 3/2013 $1.00 
Newport News, Virginia 7/2011, 7/2012 $0.10, $0.10 
Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania 1/2014 $2.00 
Virginia Beach, Virginia 7/2013 $0.05 
Note: See text for full details.  
* This number indicates the size of the change in the tax, not the level of the tax after accounting for the change.  
** For locations with 100,000 people or more.  
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Appendix table 2. E-cigarette tax adoption through end of 2017 
Locality Effective date Unit taxed Tax amount 
State    
District of Columbia 10/2015, 10/2016 Wholesale price 67.0%, 65.0% 
California 4/2017, 7/2017 Wholesale price 27.3%, 65.1% 
Kansas 7/2016, 7/2017 Per fluid milliliter $0.20, $0.05 
Louisiana 7/2015 Per fluid milliliter $0.05 
Minnesota 8/2010, 7/2013 Wholesale price 35.0%, 95.0% 
North Carolina 6/2015 Per fluid milliliter $0.05 
Pennsylvania 7/2016 Purchase price 40.0% 
West Virginia 7/2016 Per fluid milliliter $0.075 
County/City    
Chicago, Illinois  1/2016 Per unit / per fluid milliliter $0.80 / $0.55 
Cook County, Illinois 5/2016 Per fluid milliliter $0.20 
Montgomery County, Maryland 8/2015 Wholesale price 30.0% 
Notes: See text for full details. Minnesota is a treated control for our study period. Delaware and New Jersey levied e-cigarette 
taxes after 2017 (details available on request). We do not incorporate these changes into our analysis.   
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Appendix table 3. Summary statistics among respondents in all localities, and localities that did and did not adopt an e-
cigarette tax by 2017: BRFSS data, 2011–2017 
Sample 
All  
localities 
Adopting 
localities 
Non-adopting 
localities 
Outcomes    
Smoking 0.157 0.157 0.160 
Daily smoking 0.112 0.112 0.114 
Vaping 0.031 0.031 0.030 
Daily vaping 0.011 0.011 0.011 
Traditional cigarette and e-cigarette taxes    
Traditional cigarette tax rate ($ per 20-unit 
pack) 
1.449 
(0.922) 
1.490 
(0.943) 
1.273 
(0.802) 
E-cigarette tax (any) 0.064 0.000 0.344 
Area-level controls    
Restaurant smoking ban 0.700 0.702 0.688 
Private workplace smoking ban 0.705 0.703 0.713 
Bar smoking ban 0.590 0.585 0.609 
Indoor vaping restrictions (% population 
coverage) 
0.139 
(0.320) 
0.140 
(0.323) 
0.134 
(0.305) 
Beer tax ($ per gallon) 0.237 
(0.201) 
0.252 
(0.214) 
0.169 
(0.102) 
Medical marijuana law 0.408 0.425 0.333 
Marijuana decriminalized 0.328 0.361 0.185 
Prescription drug monitoring program 0.948 0.946 0.959 
ACA-Medicaid expansion 0.312 0.311 0.315 
Unemployment rate (%) 5.961 
(2.013) 
5.890 
(1.992) 
6.273 
(2.075) 
Individual-level controls    
Female 0.597 0.599 0.584 
Male 0.403 0.401 0.416 
Less than high school 0.080 0.079 0.081 
High school or GED 0.281 0.285 0.266 
Some college 0.271 0.272 0.264 
College degree or more 0.363 0.359 0.384 
Education missing 0.005 0.005 0.005 
White 0.836 0.840 0.819 
African American 0.087 0.082 0.106 
Asian 0.015 0.014 0.022 
Native American or Alaskan 0.020 0.021 0.016 
Other race 0.023 0.023 0.023 
Race missing 0.019 0.020 0.014 
Married 0.536 0.538 0.527 
Divorced 0.142 0.142 0.138 
Widowed 0.134 0.137 0.123 
Separated 0.021 0.021 0.022 
Never married 0.160 0.155 0.184 
Marital status missing 0.007 0.007 0.006 
Age (years) 56.12 
(16.42) 
56.42 
(16.38) 
54.83 
(16.63) 
Uninsured 0.092 0.091 0.094 
Insured 0.905 0.906 0.903 
Insurance missing 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Income ($; missing values imputed) 46,334 
(24,636) 
46,147 
(24,540) 
47,151 
(25,031) 
Unemployed or not in labor force 0.499 0.504 0.475 
Employed 0.494 0.488 0.517 
Employment missing 0.008 0.008 0.008 
Observations 3,140,962 2,555,342 585,620 
Notes: Data are unweighted. The unit of observation is an individual in a county in a year. Standard deviations for continuous 
variables are reported in parentheses.  
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Appendix table 4. Summary statistics among respondents in all localities, and localities that did and did not adopt an e-
cigarette tax by 2017: NHIS data, 2011–2017 
Sample 
All  
localities 
Adopting 
localities 
Non-adopting 
localities 
Outcomes     
Smoking 0.176 0.182 0.158 
Daily smoking 0.135 0.141 0.116 
Vaping 0.031 0.032 0.026 
Daily vaping 0.011 0.012 0.009 
Traditional cigarette and e-cigarette taxes    
Cigarette excise tax 1.420 
(0.946) 
1.519 
(0.993) 
1.143 
(0.734) 
Any tax on e-cigarettes 0.055 0.000 0.210 
Area-level controls    
Restaurant smoking ban 0.586 0.637 0.444 
Private workplace smoking ban 0.598 0.646 0.464 
Bar smoking ban 0.468 0.496 0.390 
Indoor vaping restrictions (% population 
coverage) 
0.128 
(0.304) 
0.118 
(0.299) 
0.157 
(0.316) 
Beer tax ($ per gallon) 0.233 
(0.194) 
0.253 
(0.217) 
0.175 
(0.076) 
Medical marijuana law 0.429 0.370 0.593 
Marijuana decriminalized 0.363 0.317 0.494 
Prescription drug monitoring program 0.952 0.946 0.969 
ACA-Medicaid expansion 0.322 0.290 0.412 
Unemployment rate (%) 6.445 
(2.098) 
6.152 
(1.958) 
7.269 
(2.254) 
Individual-level controls    
Female 0.528 0.528 0.528 
Male 0.472 0.472 0.472 
Less than high school 0.144 0.135 0.169 
High school or GED 0.263 0.270 0.242 
Some college 0.290 0.296 0.273 
College degree or more 0.289 0.285 0.299 
Education missing 0.015 0.014 0.018 
White 0.775 0.795 0.721 
African American 0.132 0.131 0.133 
Asian 0.064 0.046 0.114 
Native American or Alaskan 0.012 0.011 0.012 
Other race 0.018 0.017 0.020 
Race missing 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Married 0.569 0.573 0.559 
Divorced 0.115 0.120 0.101 
Widowed 0.064 0.065 0.060 
Separated 0.025 0.024 0.027 
Never married 0.223 0.214 0.248 
Marital status missing 0.004 0.003 0.004 
Age (years) 48.50 
(16.75) 
48.81 
(16.79) 
47.65 
(16.59) 
Uninsured 0.145 0.142 0.153 
Insured 0.845 0.848 0.835 
Insurance missing 0.010 0.010 0.013 
Income ($; missing values imputed) 21,736 
(23,331) 
21,652 
(23,186) 
21,971 
(23,730) 
Unemployed or not in labor force 0.375 0.376 0.373 
Employed 0.618 0.618 0.618 
Employment missing 0.007 0.006 0.009 
Observations 496,859 366,420 130,439 
Notes: Data are unweighted. The unit of observation is an individual in a county in a year. Standard deviations for continuous 
variables are reported in parentheses.  
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